Private Military Companies in Iraq

An Analysis of Privatization in a Counterinsurgency

Abstract

This paper examines the impact of armed private military companies on the dynamics of counterinsurgency and governance during the Iraq War. It investigates how the deployment of PMCs - particularly Blackwater - affected relationships between the US military, the Iraqi government, and Iraqi civilians. The paper outlines the historical context that led to the privatization of military functions and explores the operational challenges posed by PMCs, such as poor coordination, friendly fire incidents, and resentment among US troops due to pay disparities. It further analyzes how legal immunity for contractors, granted under Coalition Provisional Authority Order 17, strained US-Iraqi diplomatic relations and weakened the perceived legitimacy of the Iraqi government among Iraqi citizens. The paper also assesses the extent to which PMCs contributed to local hostility and insurgent violence, citing the Fallujah incident as one turning point in particular. By highlighting gaps in oversight, accountability, and cultural sensitivity, the paper argues that the use of PMCs somewhat undermined counterinsurgency goals and complicated nation-building efforts by the US government occupation of Iraq. Ultimately, while PMCs provided tactical support, their unregulated presence and behavior had broader strategic consequences for American goals, which illustrates the risks of privatizing force in conflict zones without robust legal and institutional frameworks.